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ALTERNATI E DATA AND INSIDER
TRADIN : ARE IN ESTMENT MANA ERS
ASLEEP AT T E W EEL ON I DATA USE
A STRACT
The rapid rise of “big data” has transformed the way that professional
investors make investment decisions. In addition, the intersection of the
United States federal securities laws and the use of “big data” to inform
securities trading lies in uncharted waters. The nuanced and factuallydependent securities laws are far behind industry practices, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) have remained largely silent on the issue to date. This Note argues
that this combination of murky laws and rapidly evolving business practices
gives rise to legal and regulatory risk, and that investment managers
leveraging “big data” sources may be paying insufficient attention. It is
therefore critical that to protect their business and ensure compliance with
the laws, investment managers implement robust compliance programs to
guard against the risk that their use of “big data” violates the securities laws.
INTRODUCTION
The generation, collection, and monetization of so-called “big data” has
become a matter of national discussion. We are living in what the New York
Times called “the world’s most advanced surveillance system.”1 Every day,
each one of our transactions, geo-location tags, internet searches, social
media visits, and numerous other data points are scrupulously documented
by private companies.2 The data can be used for a variety of purposes from
personally-targeted advertising to tracking the spread of an infectious
disease. 3 It can also be used to understand what is happening inside
corporations: for example, Dataminr, an “advanced AI [artificial intelligence]
platform that detects the earliest signals of high-impact events and emerging
risks,”4 applied analytics to Twitter data to uncover Volkswagen’s emissions
scandal three days before the market reacted to the news.5
For investment managers and other professional investors, these “big
data” sources, referred to collectively as “alternative data” in industry
parlance, represent a potential gold mine of information that can be used to

1. Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/locationtracking-cell- phone.html?searchResultPosition=3.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. DATAMINR, https://www.dataminr.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
5. Shaw Horton, A Fund Manager’s Roadmap to Big Data: Its Acquisition and Proper Use,
HEDGE FUND L. REP. 2 (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.lowenstein.com/media/4297/hflr_a-fundmanager-s-roadmap-to-big-data_its-acquisition-and-proper-use.pdf.
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inform securities trading.6 Alternative data is not exhaustively defined, but it
is generally understood to include any data which may be useful for
understanding the financial condition of a particular company or industry
which is not included in traditional data sources such as public financial
filings or analyst reports.7 It includes information such as geo-location tags,
satellite and drone imagery, credit card and consumer transactions, social
media data, email monitoring, website scraping, internet search data, and
many other types of data points. 8 Most alternative data leveraged by
investment managers is purchased from third-party specialty vendors who
source, process, and sell datasets to buyside purchasers via subscription
services.9
Although the use of alternative data to inform trading decisions is nothing
new, modern technologies such as high-definition satellite imagery, drones,
and sophisticated IT systems capable of identifying patterns in large unlinked
data sets have led to an explosion of growth in the quantity and types of
alternative data available.10 For example, where an investment manager in
the past might have sent an analyst to count the number of cars in a
McDonald’s parking lot to gauge the performance of the business, today that
same manager can purchase a dataset specifying the number of cars in every
McDonald’s parking lot across thousands of square miles based on an
analysis of real-time satellite images.11 Indeed, alternative data is an evolving
legal landscape because of the rapid pace of technological change and the
types of alternative data available, and changes in how data is sourced,
analyzed, and sold.12 In addition, the relevant securities laws are imprecise
and factually-dependent, there is minimal case law, and the SEC has not
brought any enforcement action to date where a buyer purchased alternative
data from a vendor.13 Additionally, the SEC announced in January 2020 that
its examinations priorities for the year will include a focus on alternative data
use.14

6. Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, SEC, From the Data Rush to the Data Wars: A Data Revolution in
Financial Markets, Georgia-State University College of Law – Henry J. Miller Distinguished
Lecture Series (Sept. 27, 2018) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein092718).
7. Horton, supra note 5 at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 1.
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. Horton, supra note 5, at 5.
13. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
14. SEC Rel. No. 2020-4, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations Announces
2020 Examination Priorities (Jan 7, 2020) (“OCIE recognizes that advancements in financial
technologies, methods of capital formation and market structures, as well as registered firms’ use
of new sources of data (often referred to as ‘alternative data’), warrant ongoing attention and
review.”).
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This Note will argue that this evolving landscape gives rise to legal and
regulatory risks, and that investment managers may be giving these risks
insufficient weight when trading on the basis of alternative data sources. Part
I begins by discussing the alternative data marketplace, including explaining
what alternative data is and how it is sourced, processed, sold, used, and by
whom. Part II then highlights the most prominent United States federal
securities laws that may be applicable to alternative data use, specifically
insider trading and the parallel provisions of Section 204A of the Investments
Advisers Act of 1940 (204A) and Section 15(g) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15(g)). Part III then discusses the current state of the mosaic
theory of materiality and argues that alternative data use is analogous to the
use of expert networks, which experienced widespread adoption in the
investment management industry, followed by a crash after Raj Rajaratnam’s
2011 conviction for insider trading, and a subsequent resurgence after firms
implemented compliance controls. Finally, Part IV argues that managers
should perform careful due diligence in order to manage the legal and
regulatory risks presented by alternative data use, and lays out suggested
compliance practices.
It is important to caveat that this Note focuses exclusively on the
intersection of alternative data and the U.S. federal securities laws, most
especially insider trading law. As is explained in further detail below, U.S.
insider trading laws do not include a general prohibition on using any given
information as a basis for securities trading decisions, absent some breach of
duty to the source of that information.15 Thus, in effect, it is legal to trade in
securities on the basis of alternative data so long as that alternative data has
not been improperly obtained.16 Of course, there are many other laws, as well
as ethical, societal, and privacy-related concerns implicated by the “big data”
marketplace both in the context of securities trading and in other areas.17
Indeed, it may or may not be legal or ethical to disseminate or use a particular
“big data” source for some other purpose. As such situations are far too
numerous and context-dependent to be addressed in this Note, they will be
left for another day.
I

ALTERNATI E DATA MARKETPLACE

According to the Wall Street Journal, when Tesla CEO Elon Musk
announced that employees were working “around the clock” to increase
deliveries of Tesla’s new mid-size Model 3 sedan, Thasos Group, a New
York City-based alternative data vendor which converts “real-time location
data from mobile phones into actionable information,”18 decided to see for

15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
Id.
See discussion infra note 57.
THASOSGROUP, http://thasosgroup.com/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
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themselves. 19 Thasos used their real-time database of geographic location
coordinates collected by over 1,000 smartphone apps from over 30 million
smartphones 20 to determine that the number of smartphones in Tesla’s
factory in Fremont California during the overnight hours had increased 30%
from June to October of 2018.21 Then, in late October 2018, “Tesla disclosed
a rare quarterly profit, the result of Model 3 production that had nearly
doubled in three months. Shares shot up 9.1% the next day.”22
Thasos, founded in 2011 by Greg Skibiski, offers a variety of analytical
reports based on smartphone location data. 23 One of the firm’s offerings,
MallStreams, which Thasos describes as “everything you ever wanted to
know about your competitor’s property but were afraid to ask,” provides realtime information on mall visitation data, distance traveled to the property,
average customer median household income, key census information based
on the mall’s location and surrounding areas, and customer cross-shopping
patterns (i.e., what stores nearby were also visited by mall customers) for
over 4,000 malls across the United States. 24 Thasos does not disclose its
clients, but according to the Wall Street Journal, Thasos “sells its data to
dozens of hedge funds, some of which pay more than $1 million a year.”25 In
addition to datasets generated by smartphone location, there are numerous
other types of alternative datasets available from many different vendors.
Eagle Alpha, a New York-based firm helping owners of datasets monetize
their data, groups alternative data into 24 different categories ranging from
social media to internet-of-things, to satellite and weather data, thus
illustrating the broad spectrum of data types available. 26 Most investment
managers acquire data through third-party vendors like Thasos and do not
pursue data collection in-house because of the expense and expertise required
to build the requisite infrastructure.27 Instead, “the overwhelming majority of
managers are acquiring data through vendors,” according to Peter Greene, a
partner at Lowenstein Sandler.28
The investment insights gained from these datasets are as expansive as
the types of datasets available. For example, Eagle Alpha’s Consumer
19. Ryan Dezember, Your Smartphone’s Location Data Is Worth Big Money to Wall Street,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-smartphones-location-data-isworth-big-money-to-wall-street-1541131260.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Interested in Powerful Real-Time Retail Analytics?, THASOSGROUP, http://thasosgroup.
com/blog/interested-retail-analytics/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
25. Dezember, supra note 19.
26. Alternative Data: Applications & Case Studies, EAGLE ALPHA 10-14 (Sept. 8, 2017),
https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/ea-pdf-items/Alternative_Data_Report_Version_2.pdf.
27. Horton, supra note 5 at 3 (“Subscription costs for many of the services offered by data
vendors are often lower than building the requisite structure internally.”).
28. Id.
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Discretionary datasets, which “provide near real-time insight, and longerterm trends, into spending at retailers and on specific products,” offer
investment managers insight into issuers’ performance before the issuer
releases earnings publicly. 29 In the municipal-bond space, investment
managers have leveraged alternative datasets to understand the economic
performance of state, local, and federal governments.30 IHS Markit, which is
“one of the largest data, insights and analytics firms in the world, [which]
leverages 1,500+ traditional and non-traditional datasets to provide unique
and timely insights to better inform investment decisions,”31 used real-time
ship tracking technology to analyze the number of cruise ships at port in
Puerto Rico from 2014 to 2017. 32 The company found that there was a
correlation between the cruise ship data and the island’s gross revenues. From
this correlation, IHS Markit was able to deduce that small declines in cruise
ship traffic were predictive of a decline in tax collections over the subsequent
months.33 IHS Markit also leveraged its database of automotive ownership to
track changes in luxury vehicle registrations in the United States in order to
understand capital and population migration across states.34 IHS Markit notes
that its database allows for tracking the model and year of each vehicle
leaving a state, as well as its destination state, which “is one potential gauge
for the movements of higher income and net worth individuals among
states.” 35 Tracking the movements for certain “vehicle owners could be a
proxy for the number of executives following companies to states with fastgrowing industries” or could signify “owners moving or expanding to more
business-friendly states.”36
Matthew Granade, Chief Market Intelligence Officer at Point72, an asset
management firm led by former S.A.C. Capital CEO Steven A. Cohen,
summarized the disruptive impact of alternative data on the market research
process:
[I]t is a real change from how investing used to work . . . if you want to
understand what is going on with McDonald’s, you are going to have to
look at credit card transactions data, you are going to look at geo-location
data, at app downloads and handful of other things. And suddenly you are

29. Alternative Data: Applications and Case Studies, supra note 26, at 15, 21.
30. See Alternative Data: Applications & Case Studies, supra note 26, at 17-18; see also Chris
Fenske, Boats, Quotes, and Automobiles: Alternative Data for Municipal Bond Investors, FACTSET
(July 14, 2017), https://insight.factset.com/boats-quotes-and-automobiles-alternative-data-formunicipal-bond-investors.
31. IHS MARKIT, https://ihsmarkit.com/topic/alternative-data-and-insights.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2019).
32. Fenske, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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going to have a very robust picture of how McDonald’s is going and you
are not going to have to talk to McDonald’s about that.37

Evan Schnidman, founder and CEO of Prattle, an alternative data vendor
which uses machine learning to analyze linguistical patterns in corporate and
governmental disclosures,38 noted, “in many ways, alternative data is what
we used to think of as research.”39 Nevertheless, the use of alternative data
still plays a supplementary role in the research process for many, especially
smaller, investment managers. As of 2019, 80% of investment managers with
assets under management (AUM) over $10 billion surveyed in the 2019 EY
Global Alternative Fund Survey indicated that they were purchasing datasets
from alternative data vendors (among other sources).40 In contrast, just 48%
of investment managers with AUM of $2 billion to $10 billion and 33% of
investment managers with AUM of under $2 billion indicated that they were
currently obtaining data from alternative data vendors.41
This discrepancy is largely due to the high signal-to-noise ratio of many
alternative datasets, and the degree of effort and capability required to
separate the proverbial needles from the haystack.42 Indeed, there are many
ways in which a dataset can fail to be useful (timeliness, completeness,
business need, statistical correlation/predictive power, etc.), and failing in
any manner can render the dataset useless.43 To make matters worse, some
datasets are delivered in unstructured, non-traditional formats, such as
satellite images or voice recordings, which makes them difficult to
incorporate into trading models. 44 For investment managers, and for
alternative data vendors themselves, this means dedicating resources to
37.
38.
39.
40.

Alternative Data: Applications & Case Studies, supra note 26, at 21-22.
Horton, supra note 5 at 2.
Id. at 1.
2019 Global Alternative Fund Survey, EY, 40 (2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/eysites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/wealth-and-asset-management/ey-global-alts-fund-survey-final.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Tamer Kamel, So Much Data, So Little Alpha, QUANDL (July 11, 2019), https://blog.quandl
.com/monetize-data-for-finance-with-care?utm_source=google
&utm_medium=organic&utm
campaign=&utm content=category /alternative-data (“More data is, of course, a good thing. But the
signal to noise ratio is deteriorating. Finding a powerful alternative dataset has always been a needle
in a haystack problem. But now the volume of hay is growing faster than needle count. For data
driven investors, the opportunity set is growing but so too is the work required to process it all.”).
43. Id. (Arguing that datasets are subject to the Anna Karenina principle, which states, “happy
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” In other words, useful data
sets share certain uniform, objective criteria: “Data is not like antiques on eBay. One man’s data
trash is not another’s data treasure. Beauty is not in the eye of the beholder; data is objectively good
or bad.” Thus if a data set fails on any one of those criteria, it becomes useless, in its own way).
44. Alternative Data: Application and Best Practices for Investment Management Firms, DOW
JONES NEWSWIRE 11 (2019), https://images.dowjones.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/35/2019/
02/25200135/Alternative-Data-Application-and-Best-Practices-for-Investment-ManagementFirms.pdf (“Alternative data comes in many different formats. Drawing these data sets into a form
that can be applied to analytical trading and investment models can be challenging. Alternative data
is often unstructured, and there is no general-purpose messaging middleware or other platform
solution for this kind of data, as there is for real-time data or historical/reference data.”).
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attempting to distinguish between useful and useless datasets; a process
which is neither quick nor easy.45 In order to come up with one or two useful
datasets, analysis of approximately fifty datasets is needed;46 and assessing
the value of each dataset (should be) a comprehensive process which includes
back-testing, reviewing data hygiene, collection, transfer, and storage
procedures, assessing legal and regulatory risks including privacy concerns
such as whether data contains personally identifiable information (PII),
whether the dataset can be integrated into trading models, and other tests.47
In summary, “[r]eliable data is hard work.”48
As a result, “the most prominent consumers of this data on Wall Street
are managers of ‘quant’ funds, which devour massive quantities of data and
translate that data into investment decisions via complex algorithms.” 49
However, traditional investment managers are also increasingly
incorporating alternative data and other quantitative strategies into their
investment decisions, 50 and many use alternative datasets to validate
hypotheses or conclusions based on traditional research. 51 Even private
equity funds, which have traditionally lagged behind hedge funds in using
alternative data as part of their investment process, are increasingly
experimenting with alternative data. 52 According to the 2019 EY Global
Alternative Fund Survey, 56% of private equity managers surveyed either
use alternative data or expect to, an increase from 52% in 2018.53 According
to Alternative Data Insider, an alternative data industry group which tracks
alternative data vendors and maintains a public database of vendor firms,54

45. Id. at 2 (“But sourcing, evaluating, integrating, and using alternative data is a non-trivial
exercise. Many providers of alternative data are experts in their field, but inexpert when it comes to
data provision. Alternative data sets may be incomplete or unverifiable; they may be unstructured
in format and difficult to integrate; they may include data that isn’t permitted for redistribution under
new privacy rules. And there may be limited or no archive available for back-testing.”).
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 10-14.
48. Id. at 14.
49. See Peter Altman, Kelly Handschumacher, & Jennifer Hustwitt, Big Data and the Risks of
Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG L. SEC. L. DAILY (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.akingump.com/
images/content/6/5/v2/65585/spBigData-SRLR-March-19-2.pdf.
50. Id.
51. Horton, supra note 5, at 3 (“[W]hile SpaceKnow has traditionally provided data to
quantitative hedge funds, they are working with an increasing number of traditional, fundamentaldriven investors who are looking to overlay their fundamental investment processes with alternative
data insights.”).
52. 2019 Global Alternative Fund Survey, supra note 40, at 39 (“For years, private equity
managers have trailed their hedge fund peers in using next generation data as part of the investment
process. The gap is closing as year over year more private equity managers are using advanced data
in the front office. Use case examples among private equity include identifying potential investment
targets and using new financial metrics to determine valuations.”).
53. 2019 Global Alternative Fund Survey, supra note 40, at 39.
54. Sanford Bragg, Free Database of Alternative Data Sources Launched, INTEGRITY
RESEARCH ASSOCS. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.integrity-research.com/free-database-alternativedata-sources-launched/.
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there are currently 445 alternative data provider firms, and the group projects
that total buy-side spending on alternative data will be $1.7B by 2020, up
from $232M in 2016.55 Despite the proliferation of alternative data across the
investment management industry, returns remain surprisingly difficult to
quantify—only about 30% of managers have attempted to quantify the
benefits of alternative data use and those who have not are increasingly facing
questions about the ROI of data acquisitions.56
II LE AL O ER IEW: FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Where Part I discussed several of the business risks posed by the use of
alternative data, Part II reviews an equally important risk posed by alternative
data use: legal and regulatory risk.57 Although alternative data users should
be cognizant of all relevant legal risks, the most critical are violations of the
United States federal securities laws discussed below, which represent an
existential threat to investment managers.58 Jeffrey Neuburger, a partner at
Proskauer, cautions:
The most important legal concerns relate to violations of the securities laws
. . . Commercial issues can be worked out quietly, but issues with the SEC
or the DOJ are in another league. While the SEC and DOJ haven’t brought
any cases yet in the alternative data space, they’ve been active in breach of
duty cases and hacking cases, so I expect them to begin to focus on it more.59

Derek Steingarten, a partner at K&L Gates, agrees: “The big brand-killer
for any manager is a regulatory investigation that is alleging a breach of
securities law in pursuing trading strategies. The fund will long be out of
business before a determination has been made as to whether the actions were
appropriate or not.”60 SEC and DOJ investigations also expose investment

55. ALTERNATIVE DATA.ORG, https://alternativedata.org/stats/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
56. 2019 Global Alternative Fund Survey, supra note 40, at 40.
57. Although outside the scope of this Note, in addition to risks posed by violations of the United
States federal securities laws, alternative data use also may expose firms to a litany of contractual,
intellectual property and tort claims, state and local laws around PII, and other United States and
foreign laws on individual data privacy. For example, an ongoing lawsuit filed by the city of Los
Angeles, California alleges that the Weather Channel sold user location data to third parties,
including hedge funds, in violation of California state law and The Weather Channel’s own user
privacy policy. Hollie Silverman & Joe Sterling, Weather Channel App Sued Over Alleged Mining
of Users’ Data, CNN (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/05/us/weather-channel-appsuit/index.html. See also Horton, supra note 5, at 5 (“Managers must understand not only the
misappropriation framework under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but also how the New
York State Attorney General and regulators in the E.U. pursue insider trading claims. Additionally,
whether engaging internally in web scraping or purchasing scraped data from third parties, managers
must be conscious of contractual, intellectual property and tort claims that a site owner may allege
against a fund manager. Finally, many of the largest challenges posed by the use of big data are
practical or ethical in nature.”).
58. Horton, supra note 5, at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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managers to particularly unpleasant consequences, including large
disgorgement and penalty judgments, officer/director and trading bars, loss
of professional licensure, personal reputational damage, large legal bills, and
in the most severe cases, criminal penalties including prison.61
A INSIDER TRADIN : RULE
For investment firms and other end-users of alternative data, the most
important regulatory concern is insider trading, or trading based on material,
non-public information (MNPI).62 Insider trading is governed by SEC Rule
10b5-1 (Rule 10b5-1), which prohibits the purchase or sale of a security of
any issuer:
On the basis of material, nonpublic information about that security or issuer;
in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer,
or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information.63

M
For information to be material, “there must be a substantial likelihood
that the fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of public information.”64 The “total mix”
of public information available is a fact-specific inquiry based on contextual
factors to determine if the inside information would have affected a
reasonable investor’s view of a particular investment decision. 65 In other
words, information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to invest.66
There is no bright-line test for materiality; however, case law and SEC
pronouncements have explained that information such as “earnings, mergers,
acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; significant
new products or discoveries, or significant developments regarding
customers or suppliers; changes in control or in management; change in
auditors; significant events regarding the issuer’s securities; and bankruptcies

61. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS.
151, 201 (2012) (“The consequences for noncompliance with the laws pertaining to insider trading
can be devastating. The DOJ may bring a criminal prosecution, resulting in a significant prison
sentence and fine if an individual defendant is found guilty. The SEC may bring an enforcement
action seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains (or losses avoided), a civil monetary penalty, and
certain professional bars.”).
62. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012).
64. SEC v. Huang, 684 F. App’x. 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2017).
65. Id.
66. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1997).
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or receiverships” are all material.67 In SEC v. Huang, a case where a corporate
insider stole a dataset of credit card transactions from his employer, the Third
Circuit found that the dataset of credit card transactions collected by Huang
was material when it represented just 2.4% of all credit card transaction
revenues at a particular retailer, because it still allowed Huang to predict
revenue more accurately than those with only publicly available data.68
Although materiality is traditionally determined from the standpoint of a
reasonable investor, managers leveraging alternative datasets should
understand that courts will generally view information in the context in which
it was conveyed, taking into account whether the investor is sophisticated and
whether they may also have the benefit of other additional information.69 In
addition, courts have found that individual investor behavior and willingness
to pay for information can give rise to a sufficient inference that the
information is material, and that information that is vague or uncertain can
also be found to be material.70
N

I

Nonpublic information becomes public for Rule 10b5-1 purposes in only
one of two ways: (1) when it is “disclosed to achieve a broad dissemination
to the investing public generally and without favoring any special person or
group;”71 or (2) when information known by only a few persons has been
traded on by those particular persons to such an extent that the information is
“fully impounded into the price of the particular stock.” 72 To constitute
nonpublic information, the information must be specific and more private
than general rumor.73 Further, information is nonpublic if it is more specific
or more certain than publicly available information, or if it provides
confirmation of public or press speculation.74
The SEC has argued in at least one case that MNPI which was
disseminated via a subscription service did not qualify as public disclosure
for Rule 10b5-1 purposes.75 In In re Certain Trading in the Common Stock
of Faberge, Inc., the SEC charged a number of broker-dealers and investment
67. Harry S. Davis, Overview of the Law of Insider Trading, PRACTISING L. INST., 3 (2017),
https://legacy.
pli.edu/product_files/Titles/4553/%23172874_Insider%20Trading%20AB%202017_2016100509
5421.pdf.
68. Huang, 684 F. App’x. at 173.
69. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 183 (citing SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 21-23 (1st Cir.
2004)).
70. Id. at 182-83 (citing SEC v. Thrasher, 152 F. Supp. 2d 291, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United
States. v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1997)).
71. Mayhew, 121 F.3d at 51 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n. 12, (1983) (citing In re
Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973))).
72. Id. at 51 (citing United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993)).
73. Id. at 50.
74. United States v. Mylett 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996).
75. In re Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 6 (1973).

2020]

Alternative Data and Insider Trading

273

advisers with insider trading in violation of Rule 10b5-1.76 In that case, a
broker-dealer and Faberge investor, after receiving news of poor Faberge
earnings from Faberge’s Vice President of Finance, disseminated the news
via AutEx, a subscription-based service for institutional investors, and then
used the same information to inform his own trading in Faberge securities.77
The SEC argued that the AutEx transmission did not qualify as public
dissemination of the earnings news because it was sent only to a limited
number of institutional subscribers.78
In SEC v. Mayhew, the Second Circuit determined that confirmation by
a corporate insider of a widely-rumored impending merger constituted
nonpublic information because the insider’s confirmation of the merger
lessened the risk associated with uncertainty about the accuracy of the
rumors.79 The court further found that the rumored merger had not been fully
impounded into the company’s stock price because although the share price
did increase on rumors of the merger in the financial press, it subsequently
declined when the merger did not immediately come to fruition, and later
increased by over 20% when the merger was later announced to the public
by the company.80
In United States v. Libera, the Second Circuit held that information
contained in pre-publication copies of Business Insider magazine, which the
defendant purchased from a friend who worked at the magazine’s printer,
constituted nonpublic information.81 The court found the defendant’s friend
had breached a fiduciary duty to his employer by taking the magazines
outside of the plant in violation of the publisher’s policy that all such
information must remain confidential until the time of publication. 82 The
court further found that the defendant knew that his friend had breached such
a duty to his employer because the defendant was willing to compensate his
friend by paying well above normal market price for copies of the magazine
pre-publication. 83 The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that
Business Insiders’ recommendations had been fully impounded into the price
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also In re Keyspan Corp. Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding that electronic filings with the SEC are public disclosure documents available to the
investigation public by dissemination in a manner reasonably calculated to reach investors. . .
through recognized channels of distribution); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 853-54
(2d Cir. 1968) (holding that MNPI regarding discovery of a mineral deposit which was
communicated to a reporter but not yet transmitted via a planned national financial news media
release was not disseminated to the investing public generally); DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc. v. Arnold
Bernhard & Co., No. 73 Civ. 3071, 1978 WL 1062, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1978) (holding that a press
release regarding poor airline earnings that was released via Reuter’s wire service, which was less
widely used than the Dow Jones broad tape, was nevertheless publicly disseminated).
79. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1997).
80. Id.
81. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
82. Id. at 601-02.
83. Id.
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of the securities prior to the defendant’s trades because although the price
had been increasing prior to the defendant’s trading, he was nevertheless able
to profit by trading ahead of the magazine’s publication.84
Thus, information which may be included in alternative datasets, which
is released directly by an issuer via traditional channels (such as a Form 8-K
or a press release) or is publicly observable (such as the number of cars in a
parking lot), is unlikely to constitute nonpublic information, even if useful
insights are gleaned from reviewing information of this type which is not yet
reflected in the price of the issuer’s stock.85 However, not all information
released by a company directly necessarily becomes public—for example, if
a company sells its users’ location data to a vendor, who processes the data
and sells it to a hedge fund, that data could be considered non-public because
it was not released to the investing public generally, but rather to one or more
investors who paid for it.86 Further, if a trader could profit by trading on
insights obtained from the purchased data, it would be difficult for the trader
to argue later that the information was so widely available that it had been
fully impounded into the price of the security.87
D
There is no general duty between market participants to forgo trading
based on MNPI—including MNPI which may be included in alternative
datasets—under Rule 10b5-1.88 Rather, the duty to disclose such information
or abstain from trading on it arises from some specific fiduciary relationship
between two parties.89 Such a fiduciary relationship can conventionally be
violated in one of two ways: (1) under the “classical” or “traditional” theory
of insider trading, whereby a corporate insider trades on the basis of MNPI
in the securities of his or her own corporation in breach of his or her fiduciary
84. Id.
85. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 175-76.
86. There is minimal case law that discusses when information has been disseminated to the
investing public, and even fewer cases which have addressed the issue since the advent of modern
technologies such as search engines and algorithms that monitor websites for breaking news.
Regulation FD (see infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text) notes that information posted to a
website which does not require a subscription or membership to view the content is considered
public for purposes of Regulation FD; however, Regulation FD also clearly explains that a violation
of its provisions, standing alone, is not sufficient to give rise to liability under Rule 10b5-1. See
Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 172-76; see also SEC, Release 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599,
Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Rel. No. 337881, Regulation FD] (“[T]o remove any doubt that private liability will not result from a
Regulation FD violation, we have revised Regulation FD to make absolutely clear that it does not
establish a duty for purposes of Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
regulation now includes an express provision in the text stating that a failure to make a disclosure
required solely by Regulation FD will not result in a violation of Rule 10b-5.”) see also 17 C.F.R.
§243 (codification of Regulation FD).
87. See discussion of Mayhew and Libera, supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
88. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 661 (1997).
89. Id.
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duty to the shareholders of the same corporation; or (2) under the
“misappropriation” theory whereby an individual misappropriates, and
subsequently trades on, MNPI in breach of a duty owed to the source of that
information.90
Courts have applied the misappropriation theory of insider trading where
employees have stolen information from their employer. In SEC v. Huang,
the defendant, an employee of Capital One, used Capital One transaction data
to predict revenues of various retail companies accepting Capital One credit
cards and subsequently used that information to inform his trading in the
securities of those retailers.91 In a jury trial, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the credit card data was both
material and nonpublic, and that the defendant had breached his fiduciary
duty to his employer by stealing it.92
Courts have also applied the misappropriation theory of insider trading
where there is no apparent fiduciary duty owed but where the defendant
fraudulently obtained insider information. In SEC v. Dorozkho, the defendant
hacked into Thompson Financial’s computer system in order to obtain
confidential press releases before they were released to the public. 93 In
remanding to the district court, the Second Circuit found that while the
defendant owed no fiduciary duty to Thompson Financial or any other thirdparty, such a fiduciary relationship is not a necessary element for Rule 10b51 liability to exist when the defendant has made affirmative fraudulent
misrepresentations.94 The court further explained that while silence is only
fraudulent if there is a duty to disclose—as under the traditional and
misappropriation theories—affirmative misrepresentations are fraudulent
absent any fiduciary duty within the context of Rule 10b5-1.95
Thus, if an investment manager purchases a dataset from a vendor,
assuming that the dataset contains MNPI, the critical question with respect to
whether trading on the basis of that dataset might give rise to Rule 10b5-1
liability is whether the dataset has been obtained in breach of a duty of trust
or confidence. 96 Managers sourcing data from vendors must therefore
understand how the vendor sourced the data, and managers sourcing data in90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 651-53.
SEC v. Huang, 684 F. App’x. 167, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 173.
SEC v. Dorozkho, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
As the discussion above makes clear, determining whether an alternative dataset contains
information which is both material and nonpublic requires legal inquiries independent of whether
that dataset has been obtained in breach of a duty. However, the fact that fund managers are (1)
willing to pay substantial sums for these datasets (or dedicate internal resources to sourcing them
in-house), and (2) willing to use them to inform their trading strategies, would seem to inherently
suggest that the datasets must contain some measure of MNPI. Indeed, if the information were in
fact not material and was widely available to the public, one would reasonably ask why it would be
valuable at all.
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house must review contracts and other terms and conditions to ensure that
data is not being obtained in breach of a duty. 97 For example, a fund
purchasing data from a vendor who sourced that data through hacking,
purchases from unauthorized employees, or other deceptive means, would
likely be exposed to Rule 10b5-1 liability analogous to the stolen Business
Insider magazines in Libera and the hacking in Dorozkho.98
SECTIONS

A AND

204A requires every investment adviser to establish, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the
misuse of MNPI by investment advisers.99 15(g) is a parallel provision to
204A that requires the same of registered broker-dealers. 100 “There is no
requirement under 15(g) that there be an underlying insider trading violation
or other violation of the Exchange Act or the rules thereunder.”101
The SEC has brought at least two enforcement actions for violations of
204A and 15(g) related to MNPI obtained from third parties. In In re
Marwood Group Research, LLC, the SEC charged Marwood with failure to
abide by its own policies and procedures requiring employees handling
MNPI to report the information to the firm’s compliance function. Marwood,
a broker-dealer and political intelligence firm, gathered MNPI from the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration and other government employees and sold
research reports based in part on that information to hedge funds and other
clients.102 The SEC further argued that Marwood’s policies and procedures
were not reasonably designed to prevent the misuse of MNPI given: (1) the
nature of Marwood’s business preparing research notes which would be sold
to clients who were expected to use the notes to inform their securities
trading; (2) Marwood employees’ regular interaction with government
employees who possessed MNPI; and (3) the fact that the determination of
whether information received from government employees constituted MNPI
was made by Marwood’s line employees rather than its Chief Compliance
Officer (CCO).103 Further, the SEC has maintained the position that if the
nature of a broker-dealer or investment adviser’s business exposes employees
to individuals in possession of MNPI on a regular basis, a policy that those

97. See discussion on suggested compliance controls infra Part IV.
98. See discussion on United States v. Libera and SEC v. Dorozkho, supra notes 81–84 and 93–
95.

99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4a (2012).
100. In re Gintel, Asset Mgmt. Inc., Advisers Act Rel. No. 2079 (Nov. 8, 2002); 15 U.S.C. §
78o(g) (formerly section 15(f) prior to 2010 renumbering).
101. In re Monness, Crespi, Hardt & Co., Inc., Exch. Act Rel. No. 72886 (Aug. 20, 2014).
102. In the Matter of Marwood Grp. Research, LLC, Exch. Act Rel. No. 76512 (Nov. 24, 2015).
103. Id.
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employees self-evaluate whether information they receive from those
individuals is in fact MNPI is insufficient to comply with 204A and 15(g).104
In In re Deerfield Management Company, L.P., the SEC charged
Deerfield with failure to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and
procedures to address the risk of employees’ misuse of MNPI obtained from
political intelligence research firms retained by Deerfield.105 Deerfield relied
on its employees to self-evaluate and self-report potential receipt of MNPI,
but failed to implement any procedures to ensure that the employees did so.106
Further, Deerfield’s policies and procedures regarding information obtained
from third-party research firms was considerably less robust than its policies
and procedures for expert networks.107 Before engaging an expert network,
Deerfield conducted a due diligence review of the network’s compliance
controls, and prior to beginning a consultation, required its analyst to provide
an oral reminder to the expert not to disclose any MNPI. 108 After the
consultation, the Deerfield analyst was required to enter a report on the
consultation into the firm’s internal database which was reviewed by
Deerfield’s head of research. 109 In contrast, Deerfield’s policies and
procedures specifically excluded research firms from this compliance process
because research firms provided a “finished product based on the research
firm’s internal expertise and research.” 110 Deerfield’s compliance manual
indicated that while Deerfield would conduct “diligence” on research firms,
it would rely upon research firms to police their own conduct.111 Further,
Deerfield’s compliance manual did not explain what these diligence reviews
should entail or how Deerfield personnel should perform them; nor did
Deerfield take any steps to enforce this requirement.112 When Deerfield did
review the policies and procedures of at least one research firm it retained,
Deerfield continued to retain that firm and use information provided by it to
inform trading decisions even after discovering red flags. One such red flag
was that the firm’s CCO was also a research analyst, and thus responsible for
reviewing his own work. Deerfield had also received numerous emails from
that same individual which contained MNPI regarding future government
actions, and Deerfield took no actions to prevent the misuse of this MNPI113

104. Id. (citing In re Gintel, Asset Mgmt. Inc., Advisers Act Rel. No. 2079 (Nov. 8, 2002); In re
Deprince, Race & Zollo, Inc., Advisers Act Rel. No. 2035 (June 12, 2002); In re Guy P. Wyserpratte,
Advisers Act Rel. No. IA-1943 (May 2, 2001); In re Certain Market Making Activities on Nasdaq,
Exch. Act Rel. No. 40910 (Jan. 11, 1999).
105. In the Matter of Deerfield Mgmt. Co., L.P., Advisers Act Rel. No. 4749 (Aug. 21, 2017).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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III ALTERNATI E DATA PRESENTS T E SAME LE AL RISKS
AS E PERT NETWORKS
The legal risks described in Part II are the same legal risks presented by
the use of expert networks. 114 Expert networks are firms which connect
industry experts, who may include academics, scientists, engineers, doctors,
lawyers, suppliers, and former employees of a company, with clients in need
of their particular expertise, who may include mutual and hedge funds, banks,
private equity, and law firms.115 For example, when a client needs an expert
opinion about healthcare or consumer goods, the client accesses an online
portal which connects them to an expert who—acting as an independent
contractor—offers consultations, written reports, market studies, and/or other
insights in exchange for fees that can exceed $1,000 per hour.116 While the
use of expert networks to inform securities trading is legal, there is a fine line
between what experts can and cannot disclose if both the expert and the client
are to remain in compliance with the securities laws. 117 Columbia Law
School Professor John Coffee said of expert networks:
I’m not saying there aren’t legitimate expert networking firms, but they are
a little like putting a group of teenagers together in one room with a lot of
booze—something is going to happen. The expert network says there shall
be no exchange of material non-public information, but why is the hedge
fund paying $30,000 or $40,000 to meet those people?118

Expert networks are understood to have sprung up in response to the
SEC’s 2000 promulgation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD).119
Regulation FD covers selective disclosure by issuers to securities market
professionals and other holders of the issuer’s securities who may be
expected to trade or otherwise profit on the basis of the disclosure. 120
Specifically, Regulation FD requires that whenever an issuer, or any person
acting on its behalf, discloses MNPI regarding that issuer or its securities to
any of the covered parties, the issuer must also make public disclosure of the
114. See e.g., Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177; Daniel H. Jeng, Expert Networks and
Insider Trading: An Introduction and Recommendation, 32 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 245, 26163 (2012-2013).
115. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177; Jeng, supra note 114, at 247-48.
116. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177; Jeng, supra note 114, at 248-49.
117. Jeng, supra note 114, at 254; see also SEC Rel. No. 2011-40, SEC Charges Hedge Fund
Managers and Traders in $30 Million Expert Network Insider Trading Scheme (Feb. 8, 2011) (“It
is illegal for company insiders who moonlight as consultants to sell confidential information about
their companies to traders, and it is equally illegal to buy that corruptly obtained information and
trade on it. . .While it is legal to obtain expert advice and analysis through expert networking
arrangements, it is illegal to trade on material nonpublic information obtained in violation of a duty
to keep that information confidential.”).
118. Ronald D. Orol, Expert Networks Key to SEC Insider-Trading Cases, MARKETWATCH (Nov.
21, 2012), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/expert-networks-key-to-sec-insider-trading-cases2012-11-21.
119. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177; Jeng, supra note 114, at 248-49.
120. SEC Rel. No. 33-7881, Regulation FD, supra note 87.
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information.121 Information is nonpublic for purposes of Regulation FD if it
has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors
generally. 122 However, “corporate management may reveal to securities
analysts…non-public information that merely fills ‘interstices in analysis,’ or
tests ‘the meaning of public information.’”123
Because issuers could no longer release information to individual
analysts without releasing it to the broader investing public generally after
Regulation FD, analysts, seeking to fill an information void, turned to experts
on particular issuers or industries for guidance. 124 By 2010, the expert
network industry had grown to produce annual revenues of $400 million,
according to a Harvard Business School case study.125 However, this growth
would be short lived—in 2011, Raj Rajaratnam of the Galleon Group was
criminally convicted of insider trading and charged in a parallel SEC civil
action which led to a $92.8 million judgment against him. Both cases
involved Primary Global Research, an expert network firm. 126 Following
Rajaratnam’s conviction, the SEC brought a string of additional enforcement
actions against several expert networks, including Primary Global Research,
involving, in aggregate, 28 defendants and $400 million of alleged illicit
profits. 127 Rajaratnam’s conviction, and the subsequent expert network
enforcement actions, unsettled the expert networks’ Wall Street client
base.128 Industry revenue dropped by 20 to 30 percent during 2011.129 Major
industry players—including Och Ziff Capital Management, Millennium
Partners, Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse—either adjusted their policies
to limit the use of expert networks or suspended the use of them entirely.130
Since 2011, expert networks have rebounded and reached $1 billion in
annual revenue industry wide as of 2018.131 Gerson Lehrman Group (GLG),
the largest expert network which captures 50% of the market, has 1,600
employees in 22 offices and over $500 million in annual revenue.132 GLG
engages with more than 600,000 experts and works with many of the world’s

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

17 C.F.R. §243 (2012).
SEC Rel. No. 33-7881, Regulation FD, supra note 87.
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977).
Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177; Jeng, supra note 114, at 249-50.
Jeng, supra note 114, at 253.
Evelyn Rusli, Next Up, a Crackdown on Outside-Expert Firms, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2011),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/next-up-a-crackdown-on-outside-expert-firms; see also
Orol, supra note 118.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Bruce Reed & Matthew Atwell, The Rise of the Expert Economy: Could Sharing Wisdom be
the Next Gig?, CIVIC, 4 (2018), https://dfbaaa3e-0ce2-4de0-929d-4611a51646be.filesusr.com/
ugd/03cac8_eb69a73ab4cc4141 af4b95880fe084b7.pdf (citing Sanford Bragg, Expert Network
Industry Nears $1 Billion, INTEGRITY RESEARCH ASSOC., (April 12, 2018)).
132. Id.
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largest banks, law firms, and industrial and pharmaceutical companies.133 In
the securities industry, a critical element of the resurgence of expert networks
has been the development of robust compliance controls put in place by firms
and internally at the expert networks themselves.134 Robert Khuzami, former
head of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, commented in a 2013 interview
on whether expert networks might receive more regulatory scrutiny in the
future:
I think this is an example where the spotlight of law enforcement helped to
clean up an industry. As a result of these prosecutions, those expert
networks that crossed the line and used their companies to engage in insider
trading are no longer in business. And also, hedge funds have imposed
controls that make sure that their research analysts and traders do not,
willingly or unwillingly, obtain inside information through these networks.
These funds are conducting due diligence on the expert networks before
they use them, making sure that the source of the information, and the
information itself, is legitimate. They are asking for certifications to ensure
that the expert network employee will not provide them with material
nonpublic information. They are chaperoning the calls with expert
networks, and taking other steps to make sure these networks are not being
abused. So, it is a good example where law enforcement focuses on certain
activity and it triggers steps by the industry to make sure abuses do not
occur.135

Despite the progress that the expert network industry has made in
compliance controls, the boundaries around expert networks and securities
trading do remain fuzzy.136 In March 2011, Preet Bharara, then the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, said there was
“nothing inherently wrong or bad about hedge funds or expert networking
firms or aggressive market research.”137 A few months later in October 2011,
then SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro assured a hedge-fund industry trade
group that “there is nothing wrong with doing tremendous due diligence”

133. Id. (“GLG works with nine of the world’s 10 largest banks, more than 30 leading global
industrials, nine of the 10 largest pharmaceuticals, and eight of the top 10 American law firms.”).
134. Id. (“Somewhat ironically, heightened scrutiny of insider trading made the leading expert
networks more sought after than ever. ‘A lot of firms picked up share, rebounded quickly, and came
out of the whole scandal in a stronger position,’ says Integrity Research principal Sanford Bragg,
who has tracked the sector for more than a decade. The leading firms beefed up their compliance
policies and touted higher standards of professional ethics on their websites, requiring ethics training
for experts. At some firms, clients can now ‘chaperone’ conversations between experts and
employees, providing additional protections within a controlled environment. GLG alone now
employs more than 50 compliance professionals, ‘a key selling point for the company,’ according
to the Financial Times.”).
135. Michael Mayhew, Resurrection of Expert Networks, INTEGRITY RESEARCH ASSOCS. (Nov.
11, 2013), http://www.integrity-research.com/resurrection-of-expert-networks/.
136. Jeng, supra note 114, at 262 (“The SEC thinks the rules are clear and that the line between
illegal insider trading and permissive due diligence is a bright line. But it is not.”).
137. Rusli, supra note 126.
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with respect to stock research.138 Statements like these provided somewhat
minimal assurance to the expert network industry and clientele because the
essence of the expert network—like the use of alternative datasets—is to
provide information that is not readily available to the public. 139 If this
information is also material and given in breach of a duty to its source, both
of which are highly situationally-dependent, trading on the basis of the
information could represent a violation of Rule 10b5-1.140
Rajaratnam’s conviction also raised doubts about the continued viability
of the “mosaic” theory of insider trading, whereby an analyst weaves together
pieces of public facts and non-material disclosures to form a mosaic, which
is only material after the pieces are assembled. 141 The mosaic theory is a
perfectly legal investment strategy and can also operate as a defense in an
insider-trading investigation.142 However, Rajaratnam’s case illustrates the
difficulty of both leveraging the theory as a defense and determining whether
information received—be it an alternative data set or information obtained
through an expert network—constitutes a permissible piece of the mosaic or
MNPI which violates insider-trading laws.143
Since 2011, the continuing viability of the mosaic theory as a defense has
been a subject of debate. Some commentators have argued that the theory is
no longer viable in light of Rajaratnam’s conviction and aggressive
prosecutorial definitions of insider trading by state and federal prosecutors
and the SEC. 144 Others have argued that Rajaratnam’s invocation of the
mosaic theory as defense was unsuccessful not because of any issue with the
mosaic theory itself; rather, it was the other more salient details of that case—
such as the McKinsey consultant who admitted to receiving over $500,000
per year from Rajaratnam in exchange for McKinsey client secrets—which
ultimately convinced the jury of Rajaratnam’s guilt.145
138. Steve Eder, SEC Chief Draws a ‘Bright Line’ on Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203752604576643474268068178
(Shapiro was responding to questions from hedge funds on whether regulators had set forth clear
rules about expert networks and insider trading. Jamie Nash, a hedge fund lawyer who attended the
conference, noted that Shapiro’s comments “reinforced what the SEC’s position has been all along
. . . . There’s nothing wrong with digging into the weeds and doing deep dives on your investments
and potential investments. But you have to make sure you have robust compliance and controls.”).
139. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 177.
140. Id. at 177-78.
141. In the Matter of Dirks, SEC Rel. No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329 (Jan. 22, 1981).
142. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 154-55.
143. Id. at 152.
144. See discussion infra note 154.
145. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. Temporary Sanity in Insider-Trading Law, WALL ST. J. (May
14, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703864204576321013619678894
(arguing in a WSJ opinion piece that Rajaratnam was found guilty by the jury not because of
prosecutor Preet Bharara’s framing of the case as being about harm to ordinary investors,
(“Unlawful insider trading should be offensive to everyone who believes in, and relies on, the
market. It cheats the ordinary investor . . .”); rather, because of “concrete and smelly wrongs exposed
in the courtroom” including “a McKinsey consultant [who] admitted to receiving $500,000 a year

282

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

Although case law directly involving the mosaic theory is limited,146 at
least one court has weighed in on the issue since 2011. In SEC v. Steffes, the
SEC charged employees of a railroad company and several of their family
members with insider trading.147 There, the employees tipped off their family
members after becoming aware that their employer appeared poised to be
acquired based on rumors amongst fellow employees, their observation of
people in suits touring the rail yards, and their having been asked to prepare
inventories of company assets. 148 The SEC alleged that the fact that the
company was for sale was MNPI and the employees had violated their
fiduciary duty to their employer by informing family members and trading
on the basis of that information,149 and in doing so had violated Rule 10b51. 150 Although the employees and their family members were ultimately
found not liable in a jury trial, in denying a motion for summary judgment
filed by the employees, the court explained that it is “well established that a
defendant can be held liable for insider trading when he or she obtains and
acts on pieces of information, which, pieced together, constitute material
nonpublic information.”151 The court further held that while the facts known
by the defendants were not material standing alone, when taken together from
the totality of information known to the defendants, the SEC could plausibly
show that the information was material. 152 Although one commentator
argued that Steffes stood for the proposition that “U.S. courts often do not
recognize the mosaic theory as a defense at all,”153 another countered that this
“unjustifiably pessimistic assessment . . . fails to appreciate the nature of the
case” because the defendants in Steffes were employees of the company who

under the table from Rajaratnam for betraying the secrets of McKinsey’s clients [and] [a]n Intel
executive [who] admitted accepting gifts and loans from Rajaratnam for blabbing inside information
about Intel”).
146. Allan Horwich, The Mosaic Theory of Materiality – Does the illusion Have a Future?, 43
SEC. REG. L. J. 129, 136 (2015) (“Very few cases have addressed the mosaic concept, fewer still by
name.”).
147. SEC v. Steffes, 805 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
148. Id. at 616.
149. Id. at 607.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 610 (citing United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir.1996)) (upholding
criminal conviction for insider trading when the defendant “was never told about the acquisition
and did no more than piece together evidence obtained while working for” the acquirer); SEC v.
Binette, 679 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D.Mass.2010) (citing SEC v. Materia, 745 F. 2d 197, 199 (2d
Cir.1984) (“A defendant may be liable under the misappropriation theory when he pieces together
incomplete fragments of confidential information provided through his employment to identify
likely acquisition targets and then trades stock in those target companies.”)); see also Horwich,
supra note 147, at 136.
152. Id. at 613.
153. Horwich, supra note 146, at 139 quoting Greene and Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 415 (2013).
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assembled their mosaic solely from internal corporate information, gained
pursuant to their employment, that they knew was confidential.154
In any case, it seems clear that reliance on the mosaic theory as a
defensive strategy exposes a defendant to considerable uncertainty regarding
the robustness of the doctrine itself (what the current state of the law actually
is) and how the court might apply the doctrine to the factual circumstances
of the case (how that law applies to the defendant’s particular circumstances).
Investment managers using alternative data to inform their trading should
understand this uncertainty and not rely heavily on the doctrine when
developing policies and procedures to prevent insider trading.
I

SOLUTION: COMPLIANCE CONTROLS TO
A AINST INSIDER TRADIN

UARD

There is evidence that investment managers may not be sufficiently
attuned to the risk that alternative data use could represent a securities law
violation. According to a recent Lowenstein Sandler survey, just 33% of
respondent hedge fund managers indicated that the risk that alternative
datasets may contain MNPI was a major concern when gathering/purchasing
and using alternative data, and just 21% indicated that increased compliance
burden was a major concern.155 In September 2018 remarks at Georgia State
University College of Law, then SEC Commissioner Kara Stein described
how alternative data market participants have prioritized returns over
regulatory risk management: “This race to collect and control data is
intensifying. Many firms and individuals are rushing onto the course but few
are thinking about what the rules of the race should be. Most are focused on
the potential benefits and not on the potential costs or unintended
consequences.”156
Thus, in order for alternative data to avoid becoming the next expert
networks, investment managers should take seriously the risk that alternative
datasets may contain MNPI. 157 As Part II discussed, an SEC or DOJ
investigation arising from alternative data use presents an existential threat

154. Horwich, supra note 146, at 139 (“Steffes was not a case where some outsider, such as an
analyst, pried one or two seemingly insignificant nuggets of information from an insider. On the
contrary, the defendants were themselves corporate employees and their tippees and all of the
information the employees allegedly used to form their mosaic—a term the court did not use—was
gleaned either from their involvement in matters that were related to the proposed sale or activities
they observed on company premises.”).
155. Peter D. Greene, Alternative Data = Better Investment Strategies, But Not Without
Concerns, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, 10 (Sept. 2019) https://www.lowenstein.com/alternative
datareport (follow the link and enter required information to access the report free of charge).
156. Stein, supra note 6.
157. See discussion supra Part III (reviewing the history of expert networks, which was marked
by wide-spread adoption, followed by a landmark insider trading violation and an immediate steep
decline in usage, and ultimately, measured re-adoption with compliance protections in place).
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to investment managers.158 In order to guard against this threat, managers
should implement compliance programs that: (1) provide assurance that
datasets have not been acquired in breach of a duty for purposes of Rule
10b5-1;159 and (2) satisfy their obligations to establish, maintain, and enforce
written policies and procedures designed to prevent misuse of MNPI under
204A and 15(g). 160 Establishing robust compliance procedures around
alternative data will both protect firms from legal and regulatory risk and
provide assurance to the SEC and DOJ that the firm takes its compliance
obligations seriously.161
As in all areas of compliance and risk management, firms seeking to
implement alternative data compliance procedures should observe general
best practices, including creating a culture which encourages employees to
report receipt of any MNPI—especially MNPI which may be sourced in an
unusual way—to legal and compliance professionals, 162 documenting
policies and procedures, 163 recording situations where employees have
received MNPI and reported it to the legal and compliance function, and
training employees on securities laws, identification of MNPI, and other
potential red flags. 164 Firms should also ensure that responsibilities and
158. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (explaining that violations of federal securities
laws represent an existential threat to investment managers).
159. With respect to Rule 10b5-1, the most significant legal question will perhaps be whether
alternative datasets have been purchased or made available for sale in breach of a duty. Regulation
FD makes clear that a violation of its provisions is not sufficient alone to give rise to a breach of
duty for 10b5-1 purposes. Thus, to prove a violation of Rule 10b5-1, the SEC must show that there
was a breach of duty (outside of a potential Regulation FD violation) where a data seller has made
a dataset available without having the contractual right to do so (e.g., a credit card company selling
customer transaction data), or a firm has collected data in breach of some other contractual
obligation (e.g., website scraping in violation of a site’s terms and conditions).
160. See discussion on enforcement actions arising from violations of 204A and 15(g) supra Part
II.
161. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 200 (“It is important to be able to demonstrate to
government investigators the extent to which a firm strives to comply with the law. For this reason,
a firm should maintain consistent and thorough documentation of its compliance program. Firms
should be able to show investigators that they have taken steps to inform employees of appropriate
policies and procedures, actively followed through in implementing and enforcing the policies and
procedures, and consistently investigated red flags and other unusual matters.”).
162. Id. at 199 (“Compliance programs should encourage employees to voice concerns and
question conduct where doubt exists as to the propriety of trading on certain information. Even firms
with the most well-designed and well-operated compliance programs will find it difficult to
completely safeguard themselves from all regulatory problems. Creating an atmosphere in which
employees feel comfortable raising legal and compliance questions helps firms ensure that they are
taking a broad view on regulatory concerns.”).
163. Id. at 200.
164. Id. at 199 (“Training programs should be robust, regular, and well-documented, including
topics covered and attendance. Such programs should focus on: the substance of the law; the
substance of the firm’s procedures; and the need to self-report or flag problematic issues for further
discussion and review. To the extent possible, training should avoid abstract analysis and instead
reflect and speak to real life activities and behaviors faced by firm personnel. . .Training should
emphasize the need to immediately reach out to compliance and legal personnel when there is any
doubt as to whether certain information can be used.”).

2020]

Alternative Data and Insider Trading

285

reporting lines are appropriately delineated such that the compliance function
enjoys sufficient independence from business pressures and support from
upper management.165
While management should make clear to front-office employees that
their obligations include protecting the firm from potential securities law
violations, front-office employees, especially those involved in securities
trading, should never be the firm’s first and last line of defense.166 Legal and
compliance professionals should instead have a strong understanding of the
firm’s business practices and be monitoring those practices as well as
individual employees for compliance with policies and procedures on an
ongoing basis, and where proposed transactions may be especially fraught
with legal or regulatory risk, providing ad-hoc approvals and advice.167 Legal
and compliance professionals should leverage legal publications and CLEs
to stay abreast of the latest developments in the securities laws and
understand that the laws around insider trading are highly nuanced and
factually-dependent and will continue to evolve as business practices change
and the SEC and DOJ develop new theories of insider trading liability.168
Effective compliance programs specific to alternative data will
necessarily focus on due diligence on data vendors and data originators
(companies actually generating alternative datasets as a byproduct of their
business).169 Due diligence on data obtained from vendors should be twopronged: research on the data vendor, and research on the alternative datasets
being considered.
First, buyers should perform due diligence on the vendor itself.170 Data
vendors may be small, private, opaque operations, with widely varying levels
of legal sophistication and risk appetite, and alternative data purchasers
should be mindful when assessing vendors that business practices have
outpaced legal developments, few best practices exist, and some data vendors
165. See discussion on enforcement actions arising from violations of 204A and 15(g), supra Part
II.

166. See generally discussion on compliance shortcomings in Marwood and Deerfield, supra
notes 102-113.
167. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 61, at 198 (“Supervisory programs should be ongoing and
tailored to the particularities of a firm’s business. Supervisors should meet regularly with persons
supervised and should be fully informed of the person’s conduct and of the business being
conducted. Firms’ supervisory procedures should include appropriate documentation of applicable
processes, including (1) monitoring of employees’ compliance with procedures; (2) supervisory
approval; and (3) trade monitoring and review.”).
168. Id. at 200-01.
169. As Part I discussed, most fund managers are sourcing data through vendors; however, to the
extent that funds may be sourcing data themselves by contracting directly with data originators or
collecting data through some other means, it will be necessary to perform due diligence on those
data originators and relevant collection procedures in addition to due diligence on data vendors.
170. ROBERT LEONARD, JEFFREY NEUBURGER, JOSHUA NEWVILLE, & JONATHAN RICHMAN,
Presentation, Big Data and Hedge Funds: Current Legal and Compliance Issues, PROSKAUER, 30
(June 7, 2017) (available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.production.proskauer/uploads/5c2ca
cdac56dac24afdfaf2b73625e09.pdf).
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may be particularly susceptible to market pressures to deliver valuable
datasets.171 Purchasers should therefore exercise skepticism when assessing
vendors by asking questions in writing, getting contractual representations,
warranties, and indemnifications,172 and seeking to understand the vendor, its
founders and employees, its methods and business practices, its other clients,
and whether it has been involved in any litigation or government
investigations.173
Second, buyers should perform due diligence on the alternative datasets
they are considering purchasing.174 Buyers should understand the nuts and
bolts of how the vendor is sourcing the data, and should especially focus on
ensuring that the vendor has the explicit right to sell the data, as a breach of
duty for purposes of Rule 10b5-1 may arise from data obtained by deceptive
means (which could potentially include, for example with web-scraping, a
violation of a website’s terms and conditions) or data sold in violation of a
contract with the data originator.175 As part of this diligence, buyers should
request and review contracts and other relevant agreements, avoid relying on
the vendor’s legal analysis, spot check the dataset, and carefully document
the diligence procedures performed. 176 Vendors and recurring alternative
datasets should be recertified on an ongoing basis, and buyers should be clear
with vendors about their aversion to MNPI and trust in their instincts about
the vendor and its data offerings.177
To the extent that firms may be sourcing alternative data in-house by
contracting directly with data originators or collecting it via other means such
as web scraping, it will be necessary to perform due diligence focused on
whether such contract or other sourcing method could represent a breach of
duty.178 With respect to contracts with data originators, buyers should focus
on whether the originator has the right to sell the data, as a breach of a
contractual obligation to a customer to keep information confidential, for
example, could represent a potential breach of duty for Rule 10b5-1

171. Id.
172. Buyers of alternative datasets should be aware, however, that contractual representations,
warranties, or indemnities may not shield them from government investigations, litigation, or other
adverse publicity if they either know or are reckless in not knowing that the dataset they are
purchasing has been sold to them in breach of a duty for purposes of Rule 10b5-1. In the civil
context, an insider-trading claim requires the government to show that the defendant was at least
reckless in not knowing whether he or she was trading on the basis of MNPI obtained in breach of
a duty, and in the criminal context, the government must show that the defendant acted “willfully,”
a standard which has been interpreted inconsistently by the lower courts, but case law seems to
approximate a standard which is roughly recklessness. See Davis, supra note 67, at 4; see also
Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L. J. F. 129 (2017).
173. LEONARD, ET AL., supra note 170, at 33-36.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Id. at 23-24.
176. Id. at 33, 38.
177. Id. at 33-36.
178. Id. at 23-28.
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purposes. 179 Buyers should also ensure that their contract with the data
originator gives them the right to use the data to inform securities trading, as
a breach of the contract’s terms could also represent a potential breach of
duty under Rule 10b5-1’s misappropriation theory.180 Firms sourcing data inhouse via other means, such as web-scraping, should ensure that their
methods do not involve deception, misrepresentations of their identity,
violation of site’s terms and conditions, or any other means of gaining
unauthorized access or otherwise circumventing controls such as “captchas,”
as any of these would likely represent a breach of duty under the
misappropriation theory of Rule 10b5-1.181 As with due diligence on vendors,
firms contracting with data originators or sourcing data via other means inhouse should request and review relevant documentation, ask questions in
writing, get contractual assurances that the originator has the right to sell the
data, and document all procedures performed.182
In addition to establishing Rule 10b5-1 compliance procedures for
alternative data use, firms should also be mindful of their obligations under
204A and 15(g).183 It is critical for firms to not only implement policies and
procedures designed to protect MNPI and avoid insider-trading, but to also
monitor compliance with those policies and procedures on an ongoing
basis. 184 Firms should avoid the compliance failures of Marwood and
Deerfield by: (1) ensuring that line employees, especially those involved in
securities trading, are not permitted to self-evaluate whether alternative
datasets contain MNPI; (2) documenting detailed procedures on how
diligence reviews of alternative data vendors, contracts, and other sourcing
methods are to be performed; (3) avoiding relying on alternative data vendors
to police their own conduct with respect to distribution of MNPI; and (4)
monitoring employees for compliance with policies and procedures on an
ongoing basis.185

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 23-24, 37.
Id.
See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Every day, companies collect millions of data points from every
American with a smartphone.186 The data is nearly simultaneously packaged
up and sold in huge datasets to a wide variety purchasers for a wide variety
of reasons, including personally-targeted advertising, political activism, and
understanding consumer movements and behaviors.. 187 This massive
proliferation of alternative data throughout every facet of modern life means
that use of these datasets to inform securities trading is not going away.
However, investment managers leveraging these alternative datasets should
understand that modern practices are far ahead of the nuanced and factuallydependent securities laws, and that doing so without the appropriate
guardrails may expose them to substantial and devastating legal and
reputational risks.
The history of expert networks offers a cautionary tale that wide-spread
adoption and common industry practices will not protect investment
managers from insider-trading investigations and prosecutions if their
conduct is violative of the law, nor is the mosaic theory likely to provide a
substantial defensive shield. The best defensive strategy is therefore a good
offensive strategy—a robust compliance program around alternative data use
will help prevent insider trading and inadvertent receipt of MNPI, satisfy the
firm’s obligations under 204A and 15(g), and in the event of a
government investigation, prosecution, or enforcement action, provide
defenses and evidence that the firm acts in good faith to comply with the
laws.
William Montemarano*

186. Thompson & Warzel, supra note 1.
187. See e.g., Sam Schechner, Emily Glazer, & Patience Haggin, Political Campaigns Know
Where You’ve Been. They’re Tracking Your Phone, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.
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